Statistics comes in two main flavors: frequentist and Bayesian. For historical and technical reasons, frequentist statistics have traditionally dominated empirical data analysis, and certainly remain prevalent in empirical software engineering. This situation is unfortunate because frequentist statistics suffer from a number of shortcomings-such as lack of flexibility and results that are unintuitive and hard to interpret-that curtail their effectiveness when dealing with the heterogeneous data that is increasingly available for empirical analysis of software engineering practice.
Introduction
Compared to other fields such as the social sciences, empirical software engineering has been using standard statistical practices for a relatively short period of time [36] . In light of the replication crisis mounting in several of the more established research fields [63] , empirical software engineering's relative statistical immaturity can actually be an opportunity to embrace more powerful and flexible statistical methods-which can elevate the impact of the whole field and the solidity of its research findings.
In this paper, we focus on the difference between so-called frequentist and Bayesian statistics. For historical and technical reasons [23, 27, 66] , frequentist statistics are the most widely used, and the customary choice in empirical software engineering (see Sect. 1.1) as in other experimental research areas. In recent years, many statisticians have repeatedly pointed out [19, 41] that frequentist statistics suffer from a number of shortcomings, which limit their scope of applicability and usefulness in practice, and may even lead to drawing flat-out unsound conclusions in certain contexts. In particular, the widely popular techniques for null hypothesis statistical testing-based on computing the infamous p-values-have been de facto deprecated [6, 35] , but are still routinely used by researchers who simply lack practical alternatives: techniques that are rigorous yet do not require a wide statistical know-how, and are fully supported by easy-to-use flexible analysis tools.
Bayesian statistics has the potential to replace frequentist statistics, addressing most of the latter's intrinsic shortcomings, and supporting detailed and rigorous statistical analysis of a wide variety of empirical data. To illustrate the effectiveness of Bayesian statistics in practice, we present two reanalyses of previous work in empirical software engineering. In each reanalysis, we first describe the original data; then, we replicate the findings using the same frequentist techniques used in the original paper; after pointing out the blind spots of the frequentist analysis, we finally perform an internal replication [14] that analyzes the same data using Bayesian techniques-leading to outcomes that are clearer and more robust. The bottom line of our work is not that frequentist statistics are intrinsically unreliable-in fact, if properly applied, they can lead to results that are often close to those brought by Bayesian statistics [80] -but that they are generally less intuitive, depend on subtle assumptions, and are thus easier to misuse (despite looking simple superficially).
Our first reanalysis, presented in Sect. 3 , targets data about debugging using manually-written vs. automatically-generated tests. The frequentist analysis by Ceccato et al. [15] is based on (frequentist) linear regression, and is generally sound and insightful. However, since it relies on frequentist statistics to assess statistical significance, it is hard to consistently map some of its findings to practical significance and, more generally, to interpret the statistics in the quantitative terms of the application domain. By simply switching to Bayesian linear regression, we show many of these issues can be satisfactorily addressed: Bayesian statistics estimate actual probability distributions of the measured data, based on which one can readily assess practical significance and even build a prediction model to be used for estimating the outcome of similar experiments, which can be fine-tuned with any new experimental data.
The second reanalysis, presented in Sect. 4 , targets data about the performance of different programming languages implementing algorithms in the Rosetta Code repository [69] . The frequentist analysis by Nanz and Furia [57] is based on a combination of null hypothesis testing and effect sizes, which establishes several interesting results-but leads to inconclusive or counterintuitive outcomes in some of the language comparisons: applying frequentist statistics sometimes seems to reflect idiosyncrasies of the experimental data rather than intrinsic differences between languages. By performing full-fledged Bayesian modeling, we infer a more coherent picture of the performance differences between programming languages: besides the advantage of having actual estimates of average speedup of one language or another, we can quantitatively analyze the robustness of the analysis results, and point out what can be improved by collecting additional data in new experiments.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contributions:
• a discussion of the shortcomings of the most common frequentist statistic techniques often used in empirical software engineering;
• a high-level introduction to Bayesian analysis;
• detailed analyses of two case studies [15, 57] from empirical software engineering, discussing how the limitations of frequentist statistics weaken clarity and generality of the results, while Bayesian statistics make for robust and rich analyses.
Prerequisites. This paper only requires a basic familiarity with the fundamental notions of probability theory. Then, Sect. 2 introduces the basic principles of Bayesian statistics (including a concise presentation of Bayes' theorem), and illustrates how frequentist techniques such as statistical hypothesis testing work and the shortcoming they possess. Our aim is that our presentation should be accessible to a majority of empirical software engineering researchers.
Scope. This paper's main goal is demonstrating the shortcomings of commonly used frequentist techniques, and to show how Bayesian statistics could be a better choice for data analysis. This paper is not meant to be:
1. A tutorial on applying Bayesian statistic tools; we refer readers to textbooks [32, 47, 51] for such step-by-step introductions.
2.
A philosophical comparison of frequentist vs. Bayesian interpretation of statistics.
3. A criticism of the two papers (Ceccato et al. [15] and Nanz and Furia [57] ) whose frequentist analyses we peruse in Sect. 3 and Sect. 4; we chose those papers because they carefully apply generally accepted best practices, in order to demonstrate that, even when applied properly, frequentist statistics have limitations and bring results that can be practically hard to interpret.
cades, both for the influence [66] of its proponents Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson, and because it offers straightforward, ready-made procedures that are computationally simple 2 . More recently, criticism of frequentist hypothesis testing has been voiced in many experimental sciences, such as psychology [19, 73] and medicine [37] , that used to rely on it heavily, as well as in statistics research itself [31, 83] . The criticism, which we articulate in Sect. 2.2, concludes that p-value-based hypothesis testing should be abandoned. 3 There has been no similar explicit criticism of p-values in software engineering research, and in fact statistical hypothesis testing is still regularly used [36] .
Guidelines for using statistics. Best practices of using statistics in empirical software engineering are described in books [52, 84] and articles [3, 43] . Given their focus on frequentist statistics, 4 they all are complementary to the present paper, whose main goal is showing how Bayesian techniques can add to, or replace, frequentist ones, and how they can be applied in practice.
An Overview of Bayesian Statistics
Statistics provides models of events, such as the output of a randomized algorithm; the probability function P assigns probabilities-values in the real unit interval .n] is the set of integers between m and n. The probability of variables over discrete domains is described by probability mass functions (p.m.f. for short); their counterparts over continuous domains are probability density functions (p.d.f.), whose integrals give probabilities. The following presentation mostly refers to continuous domains and p.d.f., although notions apply to discrete-domain variables as well with a few technical differences. For convenience, we may denote a distribution and its p.d.f. with the same symbol; for example, random variable X has a p.d.f. also denoted X, such that
Conditional probability. The conditional probability P[h | d] is the probability of h given that d has occurred. For example, d may represent the empirical data that has been observed, and h is a hypothesis that is being tested.
Consider a static analyzer that outputs (resp. ⊥) to indicate that the input program never overflows (resp. may overflow); P[OK | ] is the probability that, when the algorithm outputs , the input program is indeed free from 2 It is interesting to note that with modern computational techniques it is much less important that our statistical methods are computationally simple; we have ample CPU power to spare in particular if we could get some scientific benefit in so doing. 3 Even statisticians who still accept null-hypothesis testing recognize the need to change the way it is normally used [10] . 4 [3, 43, 84] do not mention Bayesian techniques; [4] mentions their existence only to declare they are out of scope; one chapter [9] of [52] outlines Bayesian networks as a machine learning technique.
overflows-the data is the output " " and the hypothesis is "the input does not overflow".
Bayes' Theorem
Bayes' theorem connects the conditional probabilities P[h | d], i.e. the probability that the hypothesis is correct given the experimental data, and P[d | h], i.e. the probability that we would see this experimental data given that the hypothesis actually was true. The famous theorem states:
Here is an example of applying Bayes' theorem. Priors, likelihoods, and posteriors. In Bayesian analysis [25] , each factor of (1) has a special name:
Frequentist vs. Bayesian Statistics
Despite being a simple result about an elementary fact in probability, Bayes' theorem has significant implications for statistical reasoning. We do not discuss the philosophical differences between how frequentist and Bayesian statistics interpret their results [20] . Instead, we focus on describing how some features of Bayesian statistics support new ways of analyzing data. We start by criticizing statistical hypothesis testing since it is a customary technique in frequentist statistics that is widely applied in empirical software engineering research, and suggest how Bayesian techniques could provide more reliable analyses. For a systematic presentation of Bayesian statistics see Kruschke [47] , McElreath [51] , and Gelman et al. [32] .
Hypothesis testing vs. model comparison.
A primary goal of experimental science is validating models of behavior based on empirical data. This often takes the form of choosing between alternative hypotheses, such as, in the software engineering context, deciding whether automatically generated tests support debugging better than manually written tests (Sect. 3), or whether a programming language is faster than another (Sect. 4).
Hypothesis testing is the customary framework offered by frequentist statistics to choose between hypotheses. In the classical setting, a null hypothesis H 0 corresponds to "no significant difference" between two treatments A and B (such as two static analysis algorithms whose effectiveness we want to compare); an alternative hypothesis H 1 is the null hypothesis's negation, which corresponds to a significant difference between applying A and applying B. A null hypothesis significance test [4] , such as the t-test or the U-test, is a procedure that takes as input a combination D * of two datasets D A and D B , respectively recording the outcome of applying A and B, and outputs a probability called the p-value. D * probability density Figure 1 : The p-value is the probability, under the null hypothesis, of drawing data that is at least as extreme as the observed data D * . Graphically, the p-value is the shaded area under the curve, which models the probability distribution under the null hypothesis.
The p-value is the probability, under the null hypothesis, of observing data at least as extreme as the ones that were actually observed. Namely, it is the probability P[D ≥ D * | H 0 ] 5 of drawing data D that is equal to the observed data D * or more "extreme", conditional on the null hypothesis H 0 holding. As shown visually in Fig. 1 , data is expected to follow a certain distribution under the null hypothesis (the actual distribution depends on the statistical test that is used); the p-value measures the tail probability of drawing data equal to the observed D * or more unlikely than it-in other words, how far the observed data is from the most likely observations under the null hypothesis. If the p-value is sufficiently small-typically p ≤ 0.05 or p ≤ 0.01-it means that the null hypothesis is an unlikely explanation of the observed data; thus, one rejects the null hypothesis, which corresponds to leaning towards preferring the alternative hypothesis H 1 over H 0 , that is, we have increased our confidence that A and B differ.
Unfortunately, this widely used approach to testing hypotheses suffers from serious shortcomings [19] . The most glaring problem is that, in order to decide whether H 0 is a plausible explanation of the data, we would need the conditional probability P[H 0 | D ≥ D * ] of the hypothesis given the data, not the p-value P[D ≥ D * | H 0 ]. The two conditional probabilities are related by Bayes' theorem (1), so knowing only P[D ≥ D * | H 0 ] is not enough to determine P[H 0 | D ≥ D * ]; 6 in fact, Sect. 2.1's example of the static analyzer (Ex. 2.1) showed a case where one conditional probability is 99% while the other is only 50%.
Methodological problems come from how hypothesis testing pits the null hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis: as the number of observations grows, it becomes increasingly likely that some effect is detectable (or, conversely, it becomes increasingly unlikely that no effects are), which leads to rejecting the null hypothesis, independent of the alternative hypothesis, just because it is unreasonably restrictive. This problem may result both in suggesting that some negligible effect is significant just because we reject the null hypothesis, and, conversely, in discarding some interesting experimental results just because they fail to trigger the arbitrary p ≤ 0.05 threshold of significance. This is part of the more general problem with insisting on a dichotomous view between two alternatives: a better approach would be based on richer statistics than one or few summary values (such as the p-value) and would combine quantitative and qualitative data to get richer pictures.
From type 1 and type 2 errors to type S and type M errors. Frequentist statistics often focuses on the probability of so-called type 1 and type 2 errors: Type 1: a type 1 error is a false positive: rejecting an hypothesis when it is actually true;
Type 2: a type 2 error is a false negative: accepting an hypothesis when it is actually false.
In the context of hypothesis testing, the probability of a type 1 error is often erroneously connected to the p-value. A common misconception is that the pvalue "denotes the probability of a Type I error" [4] . This statement is incorrect regardless of when we evaluate it [38] : 5 Depending on the nature of the data, the p-value may also be defined as a left-tail event P[D ≤ D * | H 0 ] or as a 2-tailed event 2 · min (P[D ≤ D * | H 0 ], P[D ≥ D * | H 0 ]). 6 Assuming that they are equal is the "confusion of the inverse" [21].
• After we have performed an experiment that gave p < α, we reject the null hypothesis. But the p-value alone cannot conclude whether the null hypothesis is actually true or not (which we need to know to figure out if we have a true or false positive).
• Before we perform an experiment, we set α and decide to reject the null hypothesis if p < α. But to compute the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis we need to assign a prior probability that the hypothesis is true. To make an extreme example: if we are certain the null hypothesis is false, the probability of a type 1 error is zero irrespective of the p-value. Only if we are certain the null hypothesis is true does the p-value really represent the probability of a type 1 error. In all other cases, the probability of a type 1 error lies between zero and α.
And as if the situation was not already looking grim for p-values, the technically correct interpretation of the significance level α as an upper bound on the probability of a type 1 error breaks down when we have multiple testing, as we illustrate in Sect. 4.2.2. Bayesian analysis prefers to avoid the whole business of hypothesis testing and instead computing actual posterior probability distributions based on data and priors. The Bayesian viewpoint also suggests that the usual frequentist preoccupation with type 1/2 errors is often misplaced: the null hypothesis captures a narrow notion of "no effects", which is rarely the case. As Gelman remarks: 7 A Type I error occurs only if the null hypothesis is true (typically if a certain parameter, or difference in parameters, equals zero). In the applications I've worked on [. . . ] I've never come across a null hypothesis that could actually be true. A Type II error occurs only if I claim that the null hypothesis is true, and I would certainly not do that, given my statement above! Instead, Gelman recommends [34] focusing on type S and type M errors. A type S error occurs when we mistakenly infer the sign of an effect: for example that a language A is consistently faster than language B, when in fact it is B that is faster than A. A type M error occurs when we overestimate the magnitude of an effect: that language A is 3 times faster than language B, when in fact it is at most 5% faster.
Scalar summaries vs. posterior distributions.
Even though hypothesis testing normally focuses on two complementary hypotheses (H 0 and its negation H 1 ), it is often necessary to simultaneously compare several alternative hypotheses h ∈ H grouped in a discrete or even dense set H. For example, in Sect. 4's analysis, H is the continuous interval of all possible speedups of one language relative to another. A distinctive advantage of full-fledged Bayesian statistics is that it supports deriving a complete distribution of posterior probabilities, by applying (1) for all hypotheses h ∈ H, rather than just scalar summaries (such as estimators of mean, median, and standard deviation, standardized measures of effect size, or p-values on discrete partitions of H). Given a distribution we can still compute scalar summaries (including confidence/ credible intervals), but we retain additional advantages such as being able to visualize the distribution and to derive other distributions by iterative application of Bayes' theorem. This supports decisions based on a variety of criteria and on a richer understanding of the experimental data, as we demonstrate in the case studies of Sect. 3 and Sect. 4.
The role of prior information. The other distinguishing feature of Bayesian analysis is that it starts from a prior probability which models the initial knowledge about the hypotheses. The prior can record previous results in a way that is congenial to the way science is supposed to work-not as completely independent experiments in an epistemic vacuum, but by constantly scrutinizing previous results and updating our models based on new evidence.
A canned criticism of Bayesian statistics observes that using a prior is a potential source of bias. However, explicitly taking into account this very fact helps analyses being more rigorous. In particular, we can often consider several different alternative priors to perform Bayesian analysis. Priors that do not reflect any strong a priori bias are traditionally called uninformative; a uniform distribution over hypotheses is the most common example. Note, however, that the term "uninformative" is misleading: a uniform prior encodes as much information as a non-uniform one-it is just a different kind of information. 8 In a different context, this misunderstanding is illustrated metaphorically by this classic koan [67, Appendix A] involving artificial intelligence pioneers Marvin Minsky and Gerald Sussman:
In the days when Sussman was a novice, Minsky once came to him as he sat hacking at the PDP-6. "What are you doing?", asked Minsky. "I am training a randomly wired neural net to play Tic-Tac-Toe" Sussman replied. "Why is the net wired randomly?", asked Minsky. "I do not want it to have any preconceptions of how to play", Sussman said. Minsky then shut his eyes. "Why do you close your eyes?", Sussman asked his teacher. "So that the room will be empty." At that moment, Sussman was enlightened.
A uniform prior is the equivalent a randomly wired neural network-with unbiased assumptions but still with specific assumptions.
Whenever the posterior distribution is largely independent of the chosen prior, we say that the data swamps the prior, and hence the experimental evidence is decidedly strong. If, conversely, choosing a suitable prior is necessary to get sensible results, it means that the evidence is not overwhelming, and hence any additional reliable source of information should be vetted and used to sharpen the analysis results.
In all, Bayesian analysis stresses the importance of careful modeling of assumptions and hypotheses, which is more conducive to accurate analyses than the formulaic application of ready-made statistics. In the rest of the paper, we illustrate how frequentist and Bayesian data analysis work in practice on two case studies based on software engineering empirical data. We will see that the strength of Bayesian statistics translates into analyses that are more robust, sound, and whose results are natural to interpret in practical terms.
Linear Regression Modeling: Significance and Prediction
Being able to automatically generate test cases can greatly help discover bugs quickly and effectively: the unit tests generated by tools such as Randoop (using random search [60] ) are likely to be complementary to those a human programmer would write, and hence have a high chance of exercising behavior that may reveal flaws in software. Conversely, the very features that distinguish automatically-generated tests from programmer-written ones-such as uninformative identifiers and a random-looking nature [22] -may make the former less effective than the latter when programmers use tests to debug faulty programs. Ceccato et al. [15] designed a series of experiments to study this issue: do automatically generated tests provide good support for debugging?
Data: Automated vs. Manual Testing
Ceccato et al. [15] compare automatically-generated and manually-written testshenceforth called 'autogen' and 'manual' tests-according to different features. The core experiments are empirical studies involving, as subjects, students and researchers, who debugged Java systems based on the information coming from autogen or manual tests. Our reanalysis focuses on Ceccato et al. [15] 's first study, where autogen tests were produced running Randoop and the success of debugging was evaluated according to the experimental subjects' effectiveness-namely, how many of the given bugs they could successfully fix given a certain time budget.
Each experimental data point assigns a value to six variables:
fixed: the dependent variable measuring the (nonnegative) number of bugs correctly fixed by the subject; treatment: auto (the subject used autogen tests) or manual (the subject used manual tests); system: J (the subject debugged Java application JTopas) or X (the subject debugged Java library XML-Security); lab: 1 or 2 according to whether it was the first or second of two debugging sessions each subject worked in;
experience: B (the subject is a bachelor's student) or M (the subject is a master's student); ability: low, medium, or high, according to a discretized assessment of ability based on the subject's GPA and performance in a training exercise.
For further details about the experimental protocol see Ceccato et al. [15] .
Frequentist Analysis
Linear model. Ceccato et al. [15] 's analysis fits a linear regression model that expresses outcome variable fixed as a linear combination of five predictor variables:
where each variable's value is encoded on an integer interval scale, and models the error as a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and unknown variance. We can rewrite (3) as:
is a normal distribution with mean µ and (unknown) variance σ 2 . Form (4) is equivalent to (3), but better lends itself to the generalizations we will explore later on in Sect. 3.3. Tab. 1 shows the results of fitting model (4) using a standard least-squares algorithm. Each predictor variable v's coefficient c V gets a maximum-likelihood estimate c V and a standard error e V of the estimate. The numbers are a bit different from those in Table III of Ceccato et al. [15] even if we used their replication package; after discussion 9 with the authors of [15] , we attribute any remaining differences to a small mismatch in how the data has been reported in the replication package. Importantly, the difference does not affect the overall findings, and hence Tab. 1 is a sound substitute of Ceccato et al. [15] 's Table III for our purposes.
Null hypothesis. To understand whether any of the predictor variables v in (4) makes a significant contribution to the number of fixed bugs, it is customary to define a null hypothesis H v 0 , which expresses the fact that debugging effectiveness does not depend on the value of v. For example, for predictor treatment :
: there is no difference in the effectiveness of debugging when debugging is supported by autogen or manual tests. Under the linear model (4), if H v 0 is true then regression coefficient c V should be equal to zero. However, error term makes model (4) stochastic; hence, we need to determine the probability that some coefficients are zero. If the probability that c V is close to zero is small (typically, less than 5%) we customarily say that the corresponding variable v is a statistically significant predictor of fixed ; and, correspondingly, we reject H v 0 .
p-values. The other columns in Tab. 1 present standard frequentist statistics used in hypothesis testing. Column t is the t-statistic, which is simply the coefficient's estimate divided by its standard error. One could show [75] that, if the null hypothesis H v 0 were true, its t statistic t v over repeated experiments would follow a t distribution t(n o − n β ) with n o − n β degrees of freedom, where n o is the number of observations (the sample size), and n β is the number of coefficients in (4).
The p-value is the probability of observing data that is, under the null hypothesis, at least as extreme as the one that was actually observed. Thus, the p-value for v is the probability that t v takes a value smaller than −|t v | or greater than +|t v |, where t v is the value of t v observed in the data; in formula:
where T is the density function of distribution t(n o − n β ). Column p-value in Tab. 1 reports p-values for every predictor variable computed according to (5) .
Significant predictors. Using a standard confidence level α = 0.05, Ceccato et al. [15] 's analysis concludes that:
• system and lab are not statistically significant because their p-values are much larger than α-in other words, we cannot reject H • treatment is borderline significant because its p-value is close to α-in other words, we tend to reject H treatment 0 .
Unfortunately, as we discussed in Sect. 2, p-values cannot reliably assess statistical significance. The problem is that the p-value is a probability conditional on the null hypothesis being true:
α is small, the data is unlikely to happen under the null hypothesis, but this does not tell us whether the null hypothesis itself is likely true. In particular, α is manifestly not the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis (a socalled Type I error)-even though you will find such statement in numerous publications (including some bona fide statistics textbooks such as [82, 68] ).
Another, more fundamental, problem is that null hypotheses are simply too restrictive, and hence unlikely to be literally true. In our case, a coefficient may be statistically significant from zero but still very small in value; from a practical viewpoint, this would be as if it were zero. In other words, statistical significance based on null hypothesis testing may be irrelevant to assess practical significance [36] .
Confidence intervals.
Confidence intervals are a better way of assessing statistical significance based on the output of a fitted linear regression model. The most common 95% confidence interval is based on the normal distribution, i.e.,
is the 95% confidence interval for a variable v whose coefficient c V has estimate c V and standard error e V given by the linear regression fit.
If confidence interval C V 95% includes zero, it means that there is a significant chance that c V is zero; hence, we conclude that v is not significant with 95% confidence. Conversely, if C V 95% for variable v does not include zero, it includes either only positive or only negative values; hence, there is a significant chance that c V is not zero, and we conclude that v is significant with 95% confidence.
Even though, with Ceccato et al. [15] 's data, it gives the same qualitative results as the analysis based on p-values, grounding significance on confidence intervals has the distinct advantage of providing a range of values the coefficients of a linear regression model may take based on the data-instead of the p-value's conditional probability that really answers the wrong question.
Interpreting confidence intervals. It is tempting to interpret a frequentist confidence intervals C V 95% in terms of probability of the value of regression coefficient c V of variable v. Nonetheless the correct interpretation does not involve probability at all. Rather, it requires to stipulate an infinite series of repeated experiments, in each of which we compute C V 95% ; then, the fraction of repetitions where the true value of c V falls in C V 95% will tend to 95% in the limit. This kind of information is unintuitive and hardly useful to connect statistical significance to practical significance [54] .
To be able to soundly interpret C V 95% in terms of probabilities we need to assign a prior probability to the regression coefficients and apply Bayes's theorem. A natural assumption is to use a uniform prior; then, under the normal model for the error term in (3), v behaves like a random variable with a normal distribution with mean equal to v's linear regression estimate c V and standard deviation equal to v's standard error e V . Therefore,
where N is the normal density function of distribution N (c V , e V )-with mean equal to c V 's estimate and standard deviation equal to c V 's standard error.
However, this entails that if C V 95% lies to the right of zero ( > 0) then the probability that the true value of c V is positive is
that is at least 97.5%.
Summary (and criticism) of frequentist statistics.
In general, assessing statistical significance using p-values is hard to justify methodologically, since the conditional probability that p-values measure is neither sufficient nor necessary to decide whether the data supports or contradicts the null hypothesis. Confidence intervals might be a better way to assess significance; however, they are surprisingly tricky to interpret in a purely frequentist setting as perusing Ceccato et al. [15] 's analysis has shown. More precisely, we have seen that any sensible, intuitive interpretation of confidence intervals requires the introduction of priors. We might as well go all in and perform a full-fledged Bayesian analysis instead; as we will demonstrate in Sect. 3.3, this generally brings greater flexibility and other advantages.
Bayesian Reanalysis
Normal data model. As a first step, let us apply Bayesian techniques to fit the very same linear model (4) used in Ceccato et al. [15] 's analysis. Tab. 2 summarizes the Bayesian fit with statistics similar to those used in the frequentist setting: for each predictor variable v, we estimate the value and standard error of multiplicative coefficient c V -as well as the endpoints of the 95% credible interval (last two columns in Tab. 2). The 95% uncertainty interval for variable v is the centered 10 
where P v is the posterior distribution of coefficient c V . Since P v is the actual distribution observed on the data, the uncertainty interval can be interpreted in a natural way as the range of values such that c V ∈ ( , h) with probability 95%.
Uncertainty intervals are traditionally called credible intervals, but we agree with Gelman's suggestion 11 that uncertainty interval reflects more clearly what they measure. 12 We could use the same name for the frequentist confidence intervals, but we prefer to use different terms to be able to distinguish them easily in writing.
The numbers in Tab. 2 summarize a multivariate distribution on the regression coefficients. The distribution-called the posterior distribution-is obtained by repeatedly sampling values 13 from a prior distribution, and applying Bayes' theorem using a likelihood function derived from (4) (in other words, based on the normal error term). The posterior is thus a sampled, numerical distribution, which provides rich information about the possible range of values for the coefficients, and lends itself to all sorts of derived computations-as we will demonstrate in later parts of the reanalysis.
Statistical significance. Using the same conventional threshold used by the frequentist analysis, we stipulate that a predictor v is statistically significant if the 95% uncertainty interval of its regression coefficient c V does not include zero. According to this definition, treatment , experience, and ability are all significant-with treatment more weakly so. While the precise estimates differ, the big picture is consistent with the frequentist analysis-but this time the results' interpretation is unproblematic.
Since the coefficients' distributions are fully available we can even plot them. In Fig. 2 , the thick vertical lines mark the estimate (the distribution's median); the shaded areas correspond to 95% probability; and the distribution curves extend to cover the 99% probability overall. Visualization supports a more nuanced view of statistical significance: it is clear that experience and ability are strongly significant; even though treatment is borderline significant, there remains a high probability that it is significant (since most of the curve is to the right of the origin); while neither system nor lab is significant at the 95% value, we can discern a weak tendency towards significance for lab -whereas system has no consistent effect.
Priors. The posterior distributions look approximately normal; indeed, we have already discussed how they are exactly normal if we take uniform priors. A uniform prior assumes that any possible value for a coefficient is as likely as any other. With completely uniform priors frequentist and Bayesian analysis tend to lead to the same overall numerical results; however, Bayesian analysis is much more flexible because it can compute posterior distributions with priors that are not completely uniform.
A weakly informative prior is the most appropriate choice in most cases. Even when we do not know much about the possible values that the regression coefficients might take, we often have a rough idea of their variability range. Take variable treatment : discovering whether it is definitely positive or negative is one of the main goals of the analysis; but we can exclude that treatment (indeed, any variable) has a huge effect on the number of fixed bugs (such as hundred or even thousands of bugs difference). Since such a huge effect is ruled out by experience and common sense, we used a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 20 as prior. This means that we still have no bias on whether treatment is significant (mean 0), but we posit that its value is most likely between −60 = 0 − 3 · 20 and +60 = 0 + 3 · 20 (three standard deviations off the mean). 14 In this case, using a completely uniform prior would not lead to qualitatively different results, but would make the estimate a bit less precise without adding any relevant information.
If we had evidence-from similar empirical studies or other sources of information-that sharpen our initial estimate of an effect, we could use it to pick a more informative prior. We will explore this direction more fully in Sect. 4.3 where we present the other case study.
Poisson data model. To further demonstrate how Bayesian modeling is flexible and supports quantitative predictions, let us modify (4) to build a generalized linear model of the Ceccato et al. [15] 's experiments.
Since system and lab turned out to be not significant, we exclude them from the new model. Excluding insignificant variables has the advantage of simplifying the model without losing accuracy-thus supporting better generalizations [51] . Then, since fixed can only be a nonnegative integer, we model it as drawn from a Poisson distribution (suitable for counting variables) rather than a normal distribution as in (4) (which allows for negative real values as well). Finally, we use a informative prior for c T corresponding to a normal distribution N (0.5, 0.8), which is a bit more informative as it nudges c T towards positive values of smallish size.
where P (λ) is the Poisson distribution with rate λ. Since λ has to be positive, it is customary to take the exponential of the linear combination of predictor variables as a parameter of the Poisson. Fitting model (6) gives the estimates in Tab. 3, graphically displayed in Fig. 3 . The results are still qualitatively similar to previous analyses: treatment , experience, and ability are significant at the 95% level-treatment more weakly so. However, a simpler model is likely, all else being equal, to perform better predictions; let us demonstrate this feature in the next section.
Quantitative prediction. Simplicity is a definite advantage of linear regression models: simple models are easy to fit and, most important, easy to interpret. After estimating the coefficients in (3), we can use those estimates to perform quantitative predictions. For example, in the linear model (3), c T = 0.66 is the average difference in the number of bugs that a programmer working with autogen tests could fix compared to working with manual tests-all other 
Even though the transparency of the linear model is a clear plus, performing estimates and predictions only based on the estimates of the regression coefficients has its limits. On the one hand, we ignore the richer information-in the form of posterior distributions-that Bayesian analyses provide. On the other hand, analytic predictions on the fitted model may become cumbersome on more complex models, such as the Poisson regression model (6) , where the information carried by regression coefficients is less intuitively understandable. Ideally, we would like to select a model based on how well it can characterize the data without having to trade this off against mainly computational issues.
Since Bayesian techniques are based on numerical methods, they shine at estimating and predicting derived statistics. We can straightforwardly sample the predictor input space in a way that reflects the situation under study, and simulate the outcomes numerically. Provided the sample is sufficiently large, the average outcome reflects the fitted model's predictions. Let us show one such simulation to try to answer a relevant and practical software engineering question based on the data at hand.
Our analysis has shown that autogen tests are better-lead to more fixed bugs-than manual tests; and that programmers with higher ability are also better at fixing bugs. Since high-ability programmers are a clearly more expensive resource than automatically generated tests, can we use autogen tests extensively to partially make up for the lack of high-ability programmers? We instantiate the question in quantitative terms:
How does the bug-fixing performance of these two teams of programmers compare?
Team low/auto: made of 80% low-ability, 10% medium-ability, and 10% high-ability programmers; using 10% manual tests and 90% autogen tests Team high/manual: made of 40% low-ability, 40% medium-ability, and 20% high-ability programmers; using 50% manual tests and 50% autogen tests
Simulating the performance of these two teams using model (6) fitted as in Tab. 3, we get that team high/manual fixes 20% more bugs than team low/auto in the same conditions. This analysis tells us that ability is considerably more decisive than the nature of tests, but autogen tests can provide significant help for a modest cost. It seems likely that industrial practitioners could be interested in simulating multiple such scenarios to get evidence-based support for decisions and improvement efforts. In fact, the posterior distributions obtained from a Bayesian statistical analysis could be used to optimize, by repeated simulation, different variables-the number of high-ability team members and the proportion of manual versus autogen test cases in our example-to reach specific goals identified as important by practitioners.
Summary of Bayesian statistics.
Using Bayesian techniques brings advantages over using frequentist techniques even when the two approaches lead to the same qualitative results. Bayesian models have an unambiguous probabilistic interpretation, which relates the variables of interest to their probabilities of taking certain values. A fitted model consists of probability distributions of the estimated parameters, rather than less informative point estimates. In turn, this supports quantitative estimates and predictions of arbitrary scenarios based on numerical simulations, and fosters nuanced data analyses that are grounded in practically significant measures.
Numerical simulations are also possible in a frequentist setting, but their soundness often depends on a number of subtle assumptions that are easy to overlook or misinterpret. In the best case, frequentist statistics is just an inflexible hard-to-interpret version of Bayesian statistics; in the worst case, it may even lead to unsound conclusions.
Direct Bayesian Modeling: The Role of Priors
Comparing programming languages to establish which is better at a certain task is an evergreen topic in computer science research; empirical studies have made such comparisons more rigorous and their outcomes more general.
In this line of work, Nanz and Furia [57] analyzed programs in the Rosetta Code wiki [69] . Rosetta Code is a collection of programming tasks, each implemented in various programming languages. The variety of tasks, and the expertise and number of contributors to the Rosetta Code wiki, buttresses a comparison of programming languages under conditions that are more natural than few performance benchmarks, yet still more controlled than empirical studies of large code repositories in the wild. For each language among C, C#, F#, Go, Haskell, Java, Python, and Ruby, Nanz and Furia [57] 's experiments involve an ordered set T( ) of programming tasks, such as sorting algorithms, combinatorial puzzles, and NP-complete problems; each task comes with an explicit sample input. For a task t ∈ T( ), R( , t) denotes the set of running times of any implementations of task t in language , among those available in Rosetta Code, that ran without errors or timeout on the same sample input.
Data: Performance of Programming Languages
Take a pair 1 , 2 of languages; T 1,2 is the set T( 1 ) ∩ T( 2 ) of tasks that have implementations in both languages. Thus, we can directly compare the performance of 1 and 2 on any task t ∈ T 1,2 by juxtaposing each running time in R( 1 , t) to each in R( 2 , t). To this end, define R 1,2 (t) as the Cartesian product R( 1 , t) × R( 2 , t): a component (r 1 , r 2 ) of R 1,2 (t) measures the running time r 1 of some implementation of a task in language 1 against the running time r 2 of some implementation of the same task in the other language 2 .
It is useful to summarize each such comparison in terms of the speedup of one implementation in one language relative to one in the other language. To this end, S 1,2 (t) is a vector of the same length as R 1,2 (t), such that each component (r 1 , r 2 ) in the latter determines component ι(r 1 , r 2 ) in the former, where
The signed ratio ι(r 1 , r 2 ) varies over the interval (−1, +1): it is zero iff r 1 = r 2 (the two implementations ran in the same time exactly), it is negative iff r 1 < r 2 (the implementation in language 1 was faster than the implementation in language 2 ), and it is positive iff r 1 > r 2 (the implementation in language 2 was faster than the implementation in language 1 ). The absolute value of the signed ratio is proportional to how much faster the faster language is relative to the slower language; precisely, 1/(1 − |ι(r 1 , r 2 )|) is the faster-to-slower speedup ratio. Nanz and Furia [57] directly compared such speedup ratios, but here we prefer to use the inverse speedups ι(r 1 , r 2 ) because they encode the same information but using a smooth function that ranges over a bounded interval, which is easier to model and to compare to statistics, such as effect sizes, that are also normalized. Among the various implementations of a chosen task in each language, it makes sense to focus on the best one relative to the measured features; that is, to consider the fastest variant. We use identifiers with a hat to denote the fastest measures, corresponding to the smallest running times: R( , t) is thus min R( , t), and R 1,2 (t) and S 1,2 (t) are defined like their unhatted counterparts but refer to R( 1 , t) and R( 2 , t). In the following, we refer to the hatted data as the optimal data. Analysis goals. The main goal of Nanz and Furia [57] 's analysis is to determine which languages are faster and which are slower based on the empirical performance data described above. The performance comparison is pairwise: for each language pair 1 , 2 , we want to determine:
1. whether the performance difference between 1 and 2 is significant; 2. if it is significant, how much 1 is faster than 2 .
Frequentist Analysis
Sect. 4.2.1 follows closely Nanz and Furia [57] 's analysis using null hypothesis testing and effect sizes. Then, Sect. 4.2.2 refines the frequentist analysis by taking into account the multiple comparisons problem [53] .
Pairwise comparisons
Null hypothesis. As customary in statistical hypothesis testing, Nanz and Furia [57] use null hypotheses to express whether differences are significant or not. For each language pair 1 , 2 , null hypothesis H 1,2 0 denotes lack of significant difference between the two languages:
0 : there is no difference in the performance of languages 1 and 2 when used for the same computational tasks Nanz and Furia [57] use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compute the pvalue expressing the probability of observing performance data ( R( 1 , t) against R( 2 , t) for every t ∈ T 1,2 ) at least as extreme as the one observed, assuming the null hypothesis H 1,2 0 . The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was chosen because it is a paired, unstandardized test (it does not require normality of the data). Thus, given a probability α, if p < α we reject the null hypothesis and say that the difference between 1 and 2 is statistically significant at level α.
Effect size. Whenever the analysis based on p-values indicates that the difference between 1 and 2 is significant, we still do not know whether 1 or 2 is the faster language of the two, nor how much faster it is. To address this question, we compute Cliff's δ effect size, which is a measure of how often the measures of one language are smaller than the measures of the other language; 15 precisely, δ < 0 means that 1 is faster than 2 on average-the closer δ is to −1 the higher 1 's relative speed; conversely, δ > 0 means that 2 is faster than 1 Table 4 : Frequentist reanalysis of Nanz and Furia [57] 's Rosetta Code data about the performance of 8 programming languages. For each comparison of language 1 (column header) with language 2 (row header), the table reports: the p-value of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing the running times of programs in 1 and in 2 (colored differently if p < 0.01 or 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05); Cliff's δ effect size, which is negative if 1 tends to be faster, and positive if 2 tends to be faster; and the median m and mean µ of the inverse speedup of 1 vs. 2 language (the one in the column header, or in the row header) is faster, that is whether δ is negative or positive. Tab. 4 also reports summary statistics of the same data: the median m and mean µ inverse speedup S 1,2 (t) across all tasks t ∈ T 1,2 . Take for example the comparison between F# and Go (column #5, row #3). The p-value is colored in yellow because 0.01 < p = 0.025 < 0.05, and hence the performance difference between the two languages is statistically significant at level 0.05. The effect size δ is colored in green because it is positive δ = 0.408 > 0 meaning that the language on the row header (Go, also in green) was faster on average.
The language relationship graph in Fig. 4 summarizes all pairwise comparisons: nodes are languages; an arrow from 1 to 2 denotes that the difference between the two languages is significant (p < 0.05), and goes from the slower Figure 4 : Language relationship graphs summarizing the frequentist reanalysis of Nanz and Furia [57] , with different p-value correction methods. In every graph, an arrow from node 1 to node 2 indicates that the p-value comparing performance data between the two languages is p < 0.01 (solid line) or 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05 (dotted line), and Cliff's δ effect size indicates that 2 tends to be faster; the thickness of the arrows is proportional to the absolute value of Cliff's δ.
to the faster language according to the sign of δ; dotted arrows denote significant differences at level 0.05 but not at level 0.01; the thickness of the arrows is proportional to the absolute value of the effect δ. To make the graph less cluttered, after checking that the induced relation is transitive, we remove the arrows that are subsumed by transitivity.
Multiple comparisons
Conspicuously absent from Nanz and Furia [57] 's analysis is how to deal with the multiple comparisons problem [53] (also known as multiple tests problem). As the name suggests, the problem occurs when several statistical tests are applied to the same dataset. If each test rejects the null hypothesis whenever p < α, the probability of committing a type I error (see Sect. 2.2) in at least one test can grow as high as 1 − (1 − α) N (where N is the number of independent tests), which grows to 1 as N increases.
In a frequentist settings there are two main approaches to address the multiple comparisons problem [4, 53] :
• adjust p-value to compensate for the increased probability of error; or
• use a so-called "omnibus" test, which can deal with multiple comparisons at the same time.
In this section we explore both alternatives on the Rosetta Code data.
P-value adjustment. The intuition behind p-value adjustment (also: correction) is to reduce the p-value threshold to compensate for the increased probability of "spurious" null hypothesis rejections which are simply a result of multiple tests. For example, the Bonferroni adjustment works as follows: if we are performing N tests on the same data and aim for a α significance level, we will reject the null hypothesis in a test yielding p-value p only if p · N < αthus effectively tightening the significance level.
There is no uniform view about when and how to apply p-value adjustments [1, 4, 30, 56, 64, 58] ; and there are different procedures for performing such adjustments, which differ in how strictly they correct the p-values (with Bonferroni's being the strictest adjustment as it assumes a "worst-case" scenario). To provide as broad a view as possible, we applied three widely used p-value corrections, in decreasing strictness: Bonferroni's [1] , Holm's [1] , and Benjamini-Hochberg's [11] .
Tab. 5 shows the results compared to the unadjusted p-values; and Fig. 4 shows how the language relationship graph changes with different significance levels. Even the mildest correction reduces the number of significant language performance differences that we can claim, and strict corrections drastically reduce it: the 17 language pairs such that p < 0.05 without adjustment become 15 pairs using Benjamini-Hochberg's, and only 7 pairs using Holm's or Bonferroni's.
Multiple comparison testing.
Frequentist statistics also offers tests to simultaneously compare samples from several groups in a way that gets around the multiple comparisons problem. The Kruskal-Wallis test [40] is one such tests that is applicable to nonparametric data, since it is an extension of the Mann-Whitney test to more than two groups, or a nonparametric version of ANOVA on ranks.
To apply Kruskal-Wallis, the samples from the various groups must be directly comparable. The frequentist analysis done so far has focused on pairwise comparisons resulting in inverse speedup ratios; in contrast, we have to consider absolute running times to be able to run the Kruskal-Wallis test. Unfortunately, this means that only the Rosetta Code tasks for which all 8 languages have an implementation can be included in the analysis (using the notation of Sect. 3.1: T( )); otherwise, we would be including running times on unrelated tasks, which are not comparable in a meaningful way. This restriction leaves us with a mere 6 data points per language-for a total of 24 = 6 · 8 running times.
On this dataset, the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that there are statistically significant differences (p = 0.002 < 0.05); but the test cannot specify which language pairs differ significantly. To find these out, it is customary to run a post-hoc analysis. We tried several that are appropriate for this setting: A closer look into the results shows that all the significant comparisons involve C and another language, with the exception of the comparisons between Go and Python, and Go and Ruby, which the pariwise Wilcoxon classifies as significant at the 95% level; no comparison is significant at the 99% level.
Summary and criticism of frequentist statistics
Analyzing significance using hypothesis testing is problematic for a number of general reasons. First, a null hypothesis is an oversimplification since it forces a binary choice between the extreme case of no effects-which is unlikely to happen in practice-versus some effects. Second, p-values are probabilities conditional on the null hypothesis being true; using them to infer whether the null hypothesis itself is likely true is unsound in general. Even if we brush these general methodological problems aside, null-hypothesis testing becomes even murkier when dealing with multiple tests. If we choose to ignore the multiple tests problem, we may end up with incorrect results that overestimate the weight of evidence; if we decide to add corrections it is debatable which one is the most appropriate, with a conflicting choice between "strict" corrections-safer from a methodological viewpoint, but also likely to strike down any significant findings-and "weak" corrections-salvaging significance to a larger degree, but possibly arbitrarily chosen.
Using effect sizes is a definite improvement over p-values: effect sizes are continuous measures rather than binary alternatives; and are unconditional summary statistics of the experimental data. Nonetheless, they remain elementary statistics that provide limited information. In our case study, especially in the cases where the results of a language comparison are somewhat borderline or inconclusive, it is unclear whether an effect size provides a more reliable measure than statistics such as mean or median (even when one takes into consideration common language effect size statistics [3] , normally referred to as Vargha-Delaney effect size [81] ). Besides, merely summarizing the experimental data is a very primitive way of modeling it, as it cannot easily accommodate different assumptions to study how they would change our quantitative interpretation of the data. Finally, frequentist best practices normally recommend to use effect size in addition to null-hypothesis testing; which brings additional problems whenever a test does not reach significance, but the corresponding effect size is non-negligible.
As specific examples that expose these general weaknesses, consider the three language comparisons between, on the one hand, F# and, on the other hand C#, Python, and Ruby. According to the p-values all three comparisons are inconclusive. The effect sizes tell a different story: they suggest a sizable speed advantage of C# over F# (δ = −0.223), and a small to negligible difference in favor of F# over Python (δ = −0.021) and Ruby (δ = −0.042). Other summary statistics make the picture even more confusing: while median and mean agree with the effect size in the F# vs. C# and F# vs. Python comparisons, the median suggests that Ruby is slightly faster than F# (m = 0.076), whereas mean and effect size suggest that F# is faster (µ = −0.03). We might argue about the merits of one statistic over the other, but there is no clear-cut way to fine-tune the analysis without arbitrarily complicating it. In contrast, with Bayesian statistics we can obtain nuanced, yet natural-to-interpret, analyses of the very same experimental data-as we demonstrate next.
Bayesian Reanalysis
We analyze Nanz and Furia [57] 's performance data using an explicit Bayesian model. For each language pair 1 , 2 , the model expresses the probability that one language achieves a certain speedup s over the other language. Speedup s is measured by the inverse speedup ratio (7) varying over the interval (−1, +1).
To apply Bayes' theorem, we need a likelihood-linking observed data to inferred data-and a prior-expressing our initial assumption about the speedup.
Likelihood. The likelihood L[d, s] weighs how likely we are to observe an inverse speedup d assuming that the 'real' inverse speedup is s. Using the terminology of Sect. 2, d is the data and s is the hypothesis of probabilistic inference. The likelihood must essentially model possible imprecisions in the experimental data; thus, we express it in terms of the difference d − s between observed and the 'real' speedup:
that is the likelihood is normally distributed with mean zero and unknown standard deviation. This just models experimental noise that might affect the measured speedups (and corresponds to all sorts of approximations and effects that we cannot control for) so that they do not coincide with the 'real' speedups.
Priors. The prior π[s] models initial assumptions on what a plausible speedup for the pair of languages might be. We consider three different priors, from uniform to biased:
1. a uniform prior U (−1, 1)-a uniform distribution over (−1, 1);
2. a weakly informative centered normal prior N (0, σ 2 1 )-a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ 1 , truncated to have support (−1, 1); 3. an informative shifted normal prior N (µ 2 , σ 2 2 )-a normal distribution with mean µ 2 and standard deviation σ 2 , truncated to have support (−1, 1); Picking different priors corresponds to assessing the impact of different assumptions on the data under analysis. Unlike the uniform prior, the informative priors have to be based on some data other than Nanz and Furia [57] 's. To this end using we use the Computer Language Benchmarks Game [77] (for brevity, Bench). The data from Bench are comparable to those from Nanz and Furia [57] as they also consist of curated selections of collectively written solutions to well-defined programming tasks running on the same input and refined over a significant stretch of time; however, Bench was developed independently of Nanz and Furia [57] , which makes it a complementary source of data.
In the weakly informative prior, we set σ 1 to the largest absolute inverse speedup value observed in Bench between 1 and 2 . This represents the assumption that the maximums observed speedups give a range of plausible maximum values for differences of speedup. This is still a very weak prior since [57] , with different prior distributions of speedups. In every graph, an arrow from node 1 to node 2 indicates that, according to the posterior probability distribution of inverse speedups, 1 is faster than 2 with 99% probability (solid line) or 95% probability (dotted line); the thickness of the arrows is proportional to the absolute value of the minimum inverse speedup. differences will mostly be much smaller than absolute values; and there is no bias because the distribution mean is zero.
In the informative prior, we set µ 2 and σ 2 to the mean and standard deviation of Bench's optimal data. The informative prior is biased towards Bench's data, as it uses Bench's performance data to shape the prior assumptions; if µ 2 0 or µ 2 0, the priors are biased in favor of one of the two languages being faster. In most cases, however, the informative priors still allow for a wide range of speedups; and, in any case, they can still be swamped by strong evidence in Nanz and Furia [57] 's data.
Posteriors and uncertainty intervals. For each pair of languages 1 and 2 , for each prior, applying Bayes' theorem gives a posterior distribution P 1,2 (s), which assigns a probability to any possible value s of inverse speedup. We summarize the posterior using descriptive statistics:
1. 95% and 99% uncertainty intervals; 2. median m and mean µ of the posterior.
Since we are trying to establish which language, 1 or 2 , is faster according to our experiments, it is useful to check whether the uncertainty intervals include the origin or not. For 95% probability, consider the leftmost uncertainty interval (c 0% , c 95% ) and the rightmost uncertainty interval (c 5% , c 100% ); that is, c x is the value such that the posterior probability of drawing an inverse speedup less than c x is x:
If c 95% < 0 there is a 95% chance that 1 is at least c 95% faster than 2 according to the posterior; conversely, if 0 < c 5% there is a 95% chance that 2 is at least c 5% faster; 16 if neither is the case, the comparison between the two languages are inconclusive at a 95% certainty level. A similar reading applies to the 99% uncertainty intervals. Fig. 5 summarize all comparisons similarly to the frequentist analysis: nodes are languages; an arrow from 1 to 2 denotes that the difference between the two languages is significant (at 95% certainty level), and goes from the slower to the faster language; solid arrows denote differences that are significant at 99% certainty level (otherwise arrows are dotted); the thickness of the arrows is proportional to the absolute value of the endpoint of the 95% or 99% certainty level closer to the origin (as explained above).
Prediction errors and multiple tests.
Multiple testing is generally not an issue in Bayesian analysis [33] . In fact, there is no null-hypothesis testing in Bayesian analysis: we are not performing multiple tests, each with a binary outcome, but computing posterior distribution probabilities based on data and priors. We can estimate mean and standard deviation of the posterior, and get a clear, quantitative picture of how likely there is an effect and of what sizeinstead of having to guess a correction for how the error in binary tests may compound. As we discussed in Sect. 2.2, it is also advisable to focus on type S and M errors, which are directly meaningful in terms of practical significance.
While it is possible to reason in terms of type S and M errors also using frequentist techniques such as effect sizes, Bayesian analysis provide a natural framework to precisely and soundly assess these probabilities of errors. In our Bayesian reanalysis of Nanz and Furia [57] 's data, we can readily assess the probability of type S and M errors:
• if a 95% uncertainty interval does not include the origin, there is at most a 5% chance of committing a type S error in that comparison;
• the width W of a 95% uncertainty interval indicates that there is at most a 5% change of committing a type M error larger than W.
Significance analysis.
There are no inconsistencies between the overall pictures drawn by the frequentist (with effect sizes) and by the Bayesian analysis. Bayesian statistics, however, produced results that are more natural to interpret in terms of practically significant measures, and lend richer information that supports a detailed analysis even when the frequentist analysis was utterly inconclusive. In quantitative terms, every "significant" difference according to frequentist analysis was confirmed by Bayesian analysis. Conversely, the Bayesian analysis provides conclusive comparisons (that is, one language being faster than another) for more language pairs than the frequentist analysis (see Tab. 7): while the latter finds significant differences in 17 language pairs (out of a total of 28), Bayesian analysis finds 18 with centered normal priors, 19 with uniform priors, and 22 with shifted normal priors.
We consider this a distinct advantage from a software engineering perspective: we could draw more conclusions from the same data. The fact that priors of different strengths lead to increasingly precise outcomes also sharpens the overall conclusions: the Rosetta dataset and the Bench dataset (used to model the more informative prior) seem to corroborate each other. More generally, such techniques support analyses where each new scientific study increases the clarity and robustness of the overall understanding of what is really going on. Even in situations where a new study does not corroborate but contradicts a previous one, we would enrich our understanding of the issues by making it more nuanced in a quantitative way.
The role of priors. Differences due to using different priors point to what kinds of assumptions are necessary to narrow down the analysis in certain cases. To disentangle the cases where weak data leads to inconclusive or inconsistent results, we can always visually and numerically inspect the posterior distributions provided by Bayesian analysis.
Consider again the three language comparisons between, on the one hand, F# and, on the other hand C#, Python, and Ruby. These were inconclusive in the frequentist analysis, but with contradictory signs given by different summary statistics. In the Bayesian analysis, we get nuanced yet clearer results; and we can go beyond a binary choice made on the basis of summary statistics, looking at the posterior distributions plot for these three cases (shown in Fig. 6 ):
C# vs. F#: regardless of the prior, the posterior estimated (inverse) speedup is negative with 95% probability. This confirms that C# tends to be faster in the experiments, largely independent of prior assumptions.
F# vs. Python: the analysis is genuinely inconclusive, as the posteriors are basically centered around the origin. The choice of prior does not play a noticeable role: even though the shifted normal prior leads to a posterior that tends to negative values, the Rosetta Code data is too weak to suggest a significant effect, even when combined with Bench's data about the same language comparison which would suggest F# is faster. Precisely, we can compute on the posterior draws that the probability, that the speedup is negative, is only 73%, and the probability that it is less than −0.1 is 58%. In fact, we can find tasks where F# is faster and tasks where Python is faster both in Rosetta Code and in Bench, indicating no clear winner.
F# vs. Ruby: here the posterior changes drastically according to the prior. With uniform and centered normal priors, we cannot claim any noticeable speedup of one language over the other. But with the shifted normal prior, the posterior lies decidedly to the left of the origin and is quite narrow, indicating a high probability that F# is much faster than Ruby; precisely, the speedup is less than −0.4 with near certainty. This dependence on the prior means that Rosetta's data about this language comparison is consistent with Bench's (both indicate that F# tends to be faster, although Bench's data is clear whereas Rosetta's is more mixed) but it is not conclusive by its own. If we are willing to take Bench as a starting point of our analysis, we can claim conclusive results with high probability; conversely, if we would like to see more evidence of F#'s greater speed, we should collect new data specifically about the comparison with Ruby and perform further Bayesian analysis.
Summary of Bayesian analysis. The availability of full posterior distributions makes Bayesian analyses more transparent and based on richer, multidimensional information than frequentist analyses. Priors are another tool unique to Bayesian analysis that fully supports 'what-if' analyses: by trying out different priors-from completely uniform to informative/biased-we can understand the impact of assumptions on interpreting the experimental data, and naturally connect our analysis to others and, more generally, to the body of knowledge of the domain under empirical investigation.
Discussion
Frequentist statistics remain the standard choice for data analysis in empirical software engineering, as it offers frameworks that are easy to apply and widely accepted as good practices. This situation is unfortunate, because frequentist techniques, as applied in practice, are plagued by a number of issues that undermine their effectiveness in practice:
• statistical hypothesis testing over-simplifies complex analyses by phrasing them as binary choices between a straw-man null hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis;
• p-values are, in general, unsound to assess statistical significance;
• multiple tests further challenge null-hypothesis testing, and there is no consensus on how to deal with them in a way that is safe and consistent;
• effect sizes and confidence intervals are useful measures, but can be surprisingly tricky to interpret correctly in terms of practically significant quantities.
In this paper, we illustrated concrete instances of the above issues from an empirical software engineering perspective. By using Bayesian statistics instead, we demonstrated gains in the rigor, clarity, and generality of the empirical analyses of Ceccato et al. [15] and Nanz and Furia [57] :
• Bayesian analysis stresses precise modeling of assumptions, uncertainty, and domain features, which help gain a deep understanding of the data;
• applying Bayes' theorem gives a full posterior distribution of each estimated parameter, which quantifies the imprecision of the estimate and supports both visual inspections and numerical analyses;
• the problem of multiple testing is immaterial, both because there is no "hypothesis testing" as such and because Bayesian analysis's quantitative posteriors support reasoning about the actual sign and magnitude of an effect rather than about possible compounding of errors that may or may not matter in practice;
• priors naturally incorporate assumptions and expectations (including from previous studies), and help understand to what extent analysis results depend on specific assumptions;
• the numeric simulation-based tools implementing Bayesian analysis techniques offer a great flexibility and support predictions in a variety of complex scenarios.
Based on these results, we recommend using Bayesian statistics in empirical software engineering data analysis. Besides supporting nuanced analyses in a variety of domains, they have the potential to step up generality and predictive ability, thus making progress towards the ultimate goal of improving software engineering practice in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. By using informed priors based on previous, related work they can further help link several empirical software engineering studies together and show what we currently can conclude based on them taken as a whole. This could help create a scientific community where more research clearly and directly builds on each other and together helps settle important problems. By simulating real-world scenarios that are relevant for practitioners it could also help better connect empirical software engineering research to practice and thus foster a greater impact.
